Escalation in the Middle East: Implications for Russia
An escalation of tensions in the Middle East, which would inevitably involve the United States in support of Israel, may appear to benefit Moscow in its pursuit of dividing the United States and its Middle Eastern allies, as Washington engages in a frantic race against time to defuse the crisis.
However, should the tensions escalate into a full-scale regional war, the cascading negative effects would also impact Moscow, given its significant regional presence in the Middle East.
Russia’s Balancing Act
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Iran was certainly intended to convey the Kremlin’s military support to Iran amidst a spiral of escalation that pits Israel against the so-called axis of resistance led by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Moscow and Tehran share significant military cooperation that extends beyond the Shahed drones that Iran provides Russia for its war in Ukraine.
Shoigu’s official reason for visiting Tehran was to finalize details of the security agreement signed between the two allies last year, which should have been clarified before the BRICS summit scheduled for autumn in Kazan, Russia. However, there was no urgent need for this, and a high-ranking Russian official would likely not visit Iran on the very day the world anticipated a possible retaliatory strike against Israel by Tehran and its proxies, unless Moscow sought assurances that the retaliation would be contained and not provoke a wider conflict with Israel in Syria, jeopardizing Russia’s strategic assets in the region.
Moscow has undoubtedly assured Tehran that it would stand by its valuable regional partner, but it has simultaneously sought reassurances that the retaliatory operation would be restrained, avoiding an uncontrollable widening of the conflict into the Syrian powder keg, where Russian naval and airbases in Tartus and Latakia could become targets if Hezbollah extends its threats from Syria.
Additionally, Moscow seems concerned about the potential for a broader conflict, given that Iran would be directly involved, leaving it unable to meet Russia’s military needs in its war in Ukraine.
At the same time, a wider conflict would jeopardize Moscow’s relations with Saudi Arabia, with whom it has an agreement on oil prices. Riyadh and the United Arab Emirates have assisted Moscow in evading sanctions. For these reasons, Shoigu conveyed a message to Tehran: avoid actions that could trigger a regional war.
Complex Interests
Shoigu’s visit was not reported by Russian media until after Ismail Haniyeh’s death, indicating its potential necessity due to the events unfolding rapidly in recent weeks. Russia and Iran anticipate concluding a long-announced defense agreement, which could be signed on the sidelines of the BRICS summit hosted by Russia from October 22-24.
In January, Iran, along with the United Arab Emirates, joined the bloc of emerging world economies consisting of Russia, India, China, and Brazil as a counterbalance to the G20. Any regional war that inevitably involves Lebanon and Syria would not align with Russia’s interests. In all likelihood, the agenda of Shoigu’s visit aimed to strike a balance between acknowledging the need for a response to Israel and containing the risk of escalation by limiting Iran’s reaction to protect Russia’s interests in the region.
Moscow was preparing to deliver missiles and other military aid to the Houthis in Yemen. The Kremlin reportedly abandoned those plans after facing opposition from Saudi Arabia. However, the fact that Russia was ready to take such action underscores the extent to which the Kremlin has been supporting Iran and its allies at Israel’s expense.
Before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin maintained strong ties with Israel, allowing it, among other things, to strike Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria, where Russia controls the airspace since intervening at President Bashar al-Assad’s request against rebel groups seeking to overthrow him.
However, the war in Ukraine has altered these calculations. Russia has become increasingly reliant on Iran as it redistributed troops and weapons systems to Ukraine, weakening its presence in Syria. Iran has also become a major supplier of combat drones and ballistic missiles to Moscow, as relations with Israel deteriorated rapidly.
Should the situation escalate, Tehran can rest assured that Russia will provide electronic warfare support, including jamming radars and similar systems from its military bases in Syria.
Iran’s Limited Response
That said, Iran does not seek a broader regional conflict either. Despite public rhetoric from Ayatollahs suggesting a harsh retaliation against Israel, Tehran reiterates its opposition to any full-scale regional conflict. The dramatic eight-hour period in which Israel eliminated Hezbollah’s second-in-command in Beirut and Hamas’ top commander in Tehran will be etched in history, but particularly in the memory of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s leaders, mullahs, and pasdaran who are now in shock. They have realized their regime’s vulnerability, with their inadequacy in intelligence and security exposed.
Their technological disadvantage compared to Israel is known. We can doubt if Iran will respond aggressively towards the Jewish state for three reasons: firstly, it would have no chance of success in an escalation; secondly, Tehran has no interest in risking a quagmire in the Middle East with the Muslim world fragmented and divided, over the killing of an individual who was not part of the regime; and thirdly, because Iran is in dire economic conditions, particularly since then-U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal signed by the P5+1 countries in 2018 and imposed even harsher sanctions on Iran.
Iran’s economy has plummeted into a deep crisis since then from which it has not recovered. This is also why Masoud Pezeshkian was elected president, presented by Ali Khamenei as a “moderate” and thus a reassuring figure, intended by the Iranian regime to protect against the opening of a dialogue with the West to remove sanctions, a necessary condition for rebuilding the country and saving the Islamic Republic of mullahs and pasdaran, who are deeply unpopular at home, opposed and contested by vast sectors of the country’s business community and especially by younger generations fighting for liberation from the regime, also accused of exploiting the Palestinian cause as a tool for rhetoric to strengthen its influence in the Muslim world.
“No for Gaza [Hamas], no for Lebanon [Hezbollah], my life is only for Iran.” This is one of the many slogans heard in the country’s streets since 2009. Iranians express their dismay and disappointment more openly towards the ruling elite, accused of allocating a significant portion of their country’s resources to supporting the Islamist groups oppressing the Palestinian people.
Tehran’s proxies, such as Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah, are seen by the population as bottomless pits consuming Iranian wealth and isolating the country. They believe the Palestinian issue has overshadowed the need to address their own economic hardship.
Thus, for Iranians, there is a different assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that the Islamic Republic chooses to ignore.
Iran is likely to respond without provoking a dramatic escalation, but in a way that salvages its damaged reputation. It cannot do more and does not seem to be inclined to avenge Haniyeh.
Turkey, like the Saudis and Sunnis in general, despite their rhetoric, do not seem overly saddened by Haniyeh’s departure, particularly since he was a Sunni who was too close to Khamenei and thus to Iran, their regional competitor and enemy. Thus, there is hope now to return Hamas to its former state before Haniyeh took over, an extremist leader who opposed peace, benefited from the bloodshed of Palestinians to fuel hatred toward Israel in the Muslim world and beyond, and increased sympathy for Hamas.
